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THE CONTROL OF LIFE: UNEXAMINED
LAW AND THE LIFE WORTH LIVING
By BERNARD STARKMAN*
Two recent Reports urge upon us the need to make available to the
mentally retarded the shared experiences of the entire community. The
Williston Report1 supports the general movement away from institutionaliza-
tion, and contains suggestions for change in government arrangements for
care and supervision. The Report of the National Institute on Mental Re-
tardation emphasizes the need for a comprehensive system of guardianship
for those of the retarded who do not come within the protection afforded
under existing statutes. It also suggests that such a system, with its special
concerns, might even be extended to include those already protected by
statute. While such a system would protect property, its particular concern
would be the person. This concern with the person is shown in various places
in the Report, usually in the context of rights relating to property, the fran-
chise, standing before the courts and so on. These discussions indicate some
considerations to be taken into account if we are to achieve the goal of
normalization for the mentally retarded. But the greatest challenge to the
policy is presented in Chapter I of the Report. Entitled "Sex and the Other
Sex", it deals with marriage, being a parent, contraception, sterilization,
abortion, annulment and divorce, and is said by the authors to have been
the most difficult chapter to write owing to the controversial nature of the
topics. 3 How much more difficult when to controversy is added handicap.
*Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Wimdsor.
1 W. B. Williston, Present Arrangements for the Care and Supervision of Mentally
Retarded Persons in Ontario, (Ontario Department of Health, 1971). The report is
the result of an investigation undertaken on behalf of the Minister of Health of Ontario,
after the alleged suicide of a mentally retarded person working out of the Rideau Re-
gional Hospital at Smiths Falls, Ontario, and injury to another retarded person who had
been discharged from the same hospital.
2 B. B. Swadron and D. R. Sullivan, Mental Retardation - The Law - Guardian-
ship: The Report of the Project to Examine the Legal Aspects of Guardianship Protection as
it Affects the Welfare of the Mentally Retarded, (Toronto: National Institute on Mental
Retardation). The introduction contains a suggestion that "caution should be taken
generally" in relying upon the law contained in the Report. It should be heeded. At 32
under "making a will" we find: 'The burden of proving incapacity is upon the party
who alleges it, that is the party objecting to the validity of the will." No distinction is
made between contestation of cases before or after probate is granted: see R. H. Hull,
The Onus of Proof in Contested Wills Cases After Probate is Granted (1971), 19
Chitty's Law Journal 84. At any rate, only Ontario seems to have shifted the ultimate
burden of proof where a will is contested after probate, and the Report purports to be
a national one. At 120-21, under "Dependants' relief legislation", surely the extract
from the judgment of Hogg, J.A. in Re Beyor Estate, [1949] O.W.N. 289; 2 D.L.R.
604 (C.A.) at 612 (D.L.R.) indicates that the conflict of interest created by the testator
in the will amounted to inadequate provision at the testators death. Incidentally, the
widow was discharged from the hospital less than six months after the testator's death.
These comments in no way detract from the general value of the Report.
3 B. B. Swadron and D. R. Sullivan, supra, note 2 at 79.
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The authors bemoan the evasive nature of the available literature, and the
lack of practical advice.
It is true that the area abounds in short, unenlightening, oft-reprinted
monographs. The reason is that with a dearth of literature, those in need of
material have made use of whatever writing seemed relevant. Seminars are
now providing the practical advice,4 and hopefully evasion of the more diffi-
cult issues will become less common in the literature. What is important now
is awareness that the topics which raise these issues are not limited to those
mentioned in "Sex and the Other Sex", and that the issues must be resolved
for the entire community. The topics we must examine in order to appreciate
the full spectrum of relevant issues are those which involve the prevention,
creation, alteration, maintenance, and termination of life through medical and
other scientific means: in short, our attempts to control life. These topics
include artificial insemination, organ transplantation, psychosurgery and the
use of drugs to control behavior, the possibility of interfering with genetic
determinants, experimentation on humans, and the use of machines and
artificial organs to prolong life. Like abortion and sterilization, they are con-
troversial. They define the attitudes of our society toward human life. It is
therefore imperative that the legal responses to these issues reflect thorough
analysis of underlying problems, e.g., the question of consent, and the role
of the criminal law in regulating practices which involve the control of life.
If the necessary research and analysis is not done, we may be presented
with legislation enacted on a piecemeal basis in response to emergencies.
Such responses may be inadequate.5 Certainly they are unlikely to provide
guidance for the future. In addition, failure to integrate their situations into a
community legislative framework for the control of life leaves the goal of
normalization for the mentally retarded as far away as ever. Only through
research in advance of lawmaking can we hope to deal in a comprehensive
way with the problems of minors, the retarded, the mentally ill and others
who are afforded special protection by the law.
4For example, the six day intensive course on "Changing Trends in Mental Edu-
cation" held at the National Institute on Mental Retardation in Toronto from August
21st to 26th, 1972. The subject areas included sex education. See also "Sex and the
Mentally Retarded", the proceedings of an all-day institute sponsored as a Greater
Cleveland Mental Retardation development project in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 22nd,
1967.
G For instance, are we to assume that the position taken by The Human Tissue
Gift Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 83 represents a considered policy decision, and that con-
sequently in Ontario minors will not be considered as potential inter vivos transplant
donors? See sections 2 and 3 (1) and (2). Minors cannot consent to post mortem gifts
for transplants (see section 4 (1) and (2) ), but section 5 (1) provides adequate oppor-
tunity for obtaining consent from a relative or "person lawfully in possession of the
body" (section 5 (1) (f)). This phrase of last resort may give rise to dispute. Sections
5 (1) (f) and 5 (4) exclude certain persons from qualifying as possessors. See Ont.
Leg. Debates, July 26, 1971 at 4775- 78 for discussion of the Bill. Sections 3 (2) and
4 (2) validate consents given by minors under certain circumstances. Section 3 (2),
which deals with inter vivos gifts, has been termed a dangerous provision: J-G. Castel,
"Medical-Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation", in J. S. Najarian and R. L.
Simmons eds., Transplantation, (Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1972) 325 at 334.
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The form such legislation should take is not the least of the problems
to be examined. It must be capable of accommodating rapid advances in
medicine and biology, and also be able to profit from the knowledge of the
social sciences. Another problem involves the reaction of doctors to the
prospect of such legislation. Faced with technological advances, doctors have
seen the need for legislation in such areas as transplantation." Where legisla-
tion has been absent, or vague, some doctors would appear to support the
enunciation of useful legislative or other guidelines. An example of vague
legislation is section 251 of the Criminal Code,7 which permits abortion by
a qualified medical practitioner, other than a member of a therapeutic abor-
tion committee for any hospital, where such a committee states that the
continuation of the pregnancy would be likely to endanger a woman's life
or health. A recent survey indicates that "a whole cluster of moral, ethical,
political and socio-economic considerations attend each decision" which
is supposedly based on likely danger to mental health.8 There is no legisla-
tion in Canada governing the sterilization, for any purpose, of non-institution-
alized persons done with consent.9 In response to the demand for male and
female sterilization, some hospitals formed sterilization committees.' 0 Medical
societies adopted guidelines to be followed in granting or refusing steriliza-
tion," though they did not attempt to enforce them, and at one time the
Canadian Medical Protective Association recommended that "sexual sterili-
zation should be done, broadly speaking, only for the preservation of the
health or life of the individual concerned."'1 2 Five years later, the Association
changed its position: "the Association thinking has reached the point where it
now feels the problems should be left for decision by the individual doctor
faced with the patient requesting the operation, to be decided just as he
would decide about any other request for non-essential treatment. One should
start by realizing that under these particular circumstances, there is no medi-
cal indication for such an operation so that doctors should not use those
words to themselves: they should think in terms of 'reasons' and then they
should weigh their patient's reasons for wishing the operation to decide if
they, the doctors, feel those reasons are valid."'13 Presumably age/parity
formulae' 4 are still being used, in conjunction with psychological and socio-
economic criteria. Another response to the absence of legislation dealing with
contraceptive sterilization is connected with abortion. At times, therapeutic
abortion committee approval has been conditioned upon sterilization of the
woman.' 5 Even in cases where there were no specific indications for steriliza-
tion, some doctors have adopted "the increasingly popular device of penalizing
the mother scheduled for a therapeutic abortion by packaging it as a unit
with a procedure for sterilization.""' Surely if our society is to legislate at
all on matters involving the control of life, it must develop useful and com-
prehensive policies to assist medical practitioners in making decisions which
do not involve medical expertise.
Policy usually manifests itself as principle. Traditionally legislators have
looked to common law and custom for principles to use in the framework
of reform. In the areas under discussion the principles are to be found in
Torts, Property, Family Law and the Criminal Law. One of the most import-
'"The Human Tissue Gift Act, 1971, ... is, with minor changes, the draft pre-
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pared in 1969-1970 by an ad hoc committee of the Medical-Legal Society of Toronto."
Castel, supra, note 5 at 348.
7R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34.
SK. D. Smith and H. S. Wineberg, A Survey of Therapeutic Abortion Committees
(1969), 12 Criminal Law Quarterly 279 at 303.
0 Apart from the unlikely application of section 228 of the Criminal Code (maim-
ing) to non-therapeutic sterilization. See G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the
Criminal Law, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957) at 103-05; J. Miller and G. Dean,
Civil and Criminal Liability of Physicians for Sterilization Operations (1930), 16 Ame-
rican Bar Association Journal 158, at 158-60; L. K. Champlin and M. E. Winslow,
Elective Sterilization (1965), 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 415 at 428-29.
10See reference, infra, note 11, guideline 7. The same reaction to the absence of
legislation occurred in the United States: Champlin and Winslow, supra, note 9 at 426.
11 E.g., the guidelines for male and female sterilization which were approved at the
annual meeting of the Manitoba Medical Association in April, 1970:
1. Where medical indication for sterilization exists, a documented consulta-
tion with an appropriate consultant or consultants is recommended.
2. Where a woman is aged twenty-five and has five living children or is
aged thirty and has four living children or is aged thirty-five and has three living
children and the couple requests sterilization and the patient's doctor agrees
sterilization of either the husband or the wife should be allowed without further
consultation. The attending doctor should have adequate documentation to sup-
port his opinion.
3. Where the patient does not meet the requirements outlined in No. 2
above and the couple requests sterilization, consultation should be required before
either male or female sterilization is performed.
4. The use of hospital beds for female sterilization should not be at the
expense of longer waiting lists for patients requiring hospitalization for medical
indications. In this connection immediate post-partum tubal ligation is desirable
as it eliminates the necessity for a special hospital admission and should not in-
volve a longer post-partum hospital stay.
5. Hospitals in Manitoba which are financed through the Manitoba Hospital
Commission should be asked to permit male and female sterilization.
6. An operative consent form to be signed by both husband and wife should
name the operation to be done, should state that the operation is not only con-
sented to, but requested by the patient and his or her spouse, that the patient has
been informed he or she may no longer be able to produce children, that the
results of the operation may be permanent and irreversible and that having this
knowledge he or she persisted in the request.
7. If the above recommendations are adopted the need for sterilization com-
mittees no longer exists.
12 T. L. Fisher, Legal Implications of Sterilization (1964), 91 C.M.A. Journal 1363
at 1365.
l3 Sexual Sterilization for Non-Medical Reasons (1970), 102 C.M.A. Journal 211.
14 For some additional examples, see Champlin and Wimslow, supra, note 9 at 420.
15Id., at 423; H. J. Myers, "The Problem of Sterilization: Sociologic, Eugenic,
and Individual Considerations", in H. Rosen ed., Abortion in America, (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1967) 87 at 93.
16 A. J. Mandy, "Reflections of a Gynecologist", in Rosen, supra, note 15, 284 at
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ant is the protean principle of consent,17 which in the common law reflects
the social policies of many periods. This and other principles have been
developed without regard to their possible application in what must today
be regarded as a new and distinct field, the Control of Life. It is necessary
to understand the ways in which they have been used before they can be
employed successfully in solving new problems. The writer proposes to des-
cribe briefly the results of sterilization movements active in the United States
and Canada from the end of the nineteenth century to the present in order
to illustrate the dangers of legislation proceeding from the enthusiasm of
experts' s and the fears of the general population.19
The present significance of the terminology employed must first be
considered. Voluntary sterilization is commonly divided into three categories:
therapeutic, contraceptive, and eugenic. These terms indicate only the primary
purpose for which the procedure is employed: obviously more than one term
may be applicable in a particular case. Danger to the life of the wife is an
indication for therapeutic sterilization of wife or husband, though there is
no threat to the husband.20 The threat of serious physical or mental defect
in the offspring is an indication for eugenic sterilization. No doubt many
17In the Criminal Code consent by a minor is usually a defence where a person
is charged with an offence which requires the absence of consent. (Some exceptions are
section 140, which refers to sections 149 and 156, and section 158, which refers to
sections 155 and 157). An example of this general principle is the requirement of con-
sent to an abortion recognized by section 251(7) of the Criminal Code, a section which
does not require consent by the parents or guardian. The minor's consent is sufficient.
However, in the civil law, the physician probably would be liable if the operation was
performed without the consent of the minor's parents or guardian, although consent was
given by the minor. These differing attitudes of the civil and criminal law to the
question of consent are also found in the law of New York. See L. Holtzman, Medical-
Legal Considerations of Abortion in New York State under the New Abortion Law
(1971), 14 Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 36 at 38-40. The author is a Justice of
the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
18 M. H. Hailer, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought, (New
Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1963) at 124.
In 1905 Pennsylvania became the first state to pass a sterilization bill. Governor
Pennypacker refused to sign the bill, which was entitled "An Act for the prevention of
idiocy", and in his message to the senate he criticized the wide powers entrusted to the
scientific experts under the vague provisions of the bill. The Governor also objected that
the bill would permit experimentation upon living human beings. His message to the
senate is quoted at length in Ferster, infra, note 28 at 593. At the end of his term,
Governor Pennypacker was called on to speak at a newspaper dinner held at the end
of the Legislative session. He had hardly begun when the newsmen began to give him
a hard time. "He was not the least taken aback but after some minutes of pandemonium
he raised his arms for silence and then squeaked out in his funny voice: 'Gentlemen,
gentlemen! You forget you owe me a vote of thanks. Didn't I veto the bill for the
castration of idiots?' This brought down the house and assured him a respectful hearing."
E. L Van Roden, Sterilization of Abnormal Persons as Punishment For and Prevention
of Crimes (1949), 23 Temple Law Quarterly 99 at 106.
19 J. Paul, The Psychiatrist As Public Administrator. Case in Point: State Steriliza-
tion Laws (1968), 38 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 76 at 77.
20 See N. St. John-Stevas, The Agonizing Choice, (London: Eyre and Spottis-
woode, 1971) at 25, n.4: "In 1970 vasectomy, the male sterilization operation, became
available under the [U.K.] National Health Service on grounds of potential ill health
to a husband or wife. (Author's italics).
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therapeutic abortion committees would approve an abortion in such an in-
stance on the ground of danger to mental health.21 Risk of serious defect in
the child would play a part in the decision, even though it is not a ground
for abortion under section 251 of the Criminal Code. Today, voluntary
sterilization is not confined to medical indications. The husband would have
little difficulty in obtaining a vasectomy. What of the woman who already
has children, cannot make effective use of contraceptive devices, and whose
socio-economic circumstances dictate that she should have no more children?
Her husband may refuse to undergo vasectomy, or the physician may con-
sider it inadvisable on psychological grounds. If she chooses her doctor
carefully, she will "have her tubes tied" upon request after delivery. The
operation is subject to the usual hospital regulations, but there is no legisla-
tion in Canada governing either male or female sterilization of non-institution-
alized persons done with consent.23 The only practical distinction between
therapeutic and contraceptive sterilization, apart from the possible reluctance
of some doctors to perform the operation for purely contraceptive purposes,
is that in a situation involving immediate urgency, a doctor may be justified
in performing therapeutic sterilization without waiting to obtain the patient's
consent.24 One of the reasons advanced for sterilization of the mentally re-
tarded was that children were a burden which might lead to the breakdown
of marriages which otherwise had a chance of succeeding.5 This argument
is one for therapeutic sterilization, but here, since the person involved is
mentally retarded, the problem of consent is a difficult one. It is complicated
by the fact that a great number of American state eugenic sterilization statutes
as well as Alberta's Sexual Sterilization Act26 provide for compulsory as well
as voluntary sterilization of institutionalized persons, 27 and they contain a
21 See Smith and Wineberg, supra, note 8 at 298.
22 "Despite the uncertain legal status of eugenic as distinguished from therapeutic
abortion, such operations are regularly performed by responsible physicians in hospitals
throughout the country." Comments on section 207.11, Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959,
Model Penal Code of the The American Law Institute, at 154. Section 230.3 of the
Institute's 1962 Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code includes substantial
risk of grave physical or mental defect in the child as a justification for abortion. A
number of states have enacted legislation adopting this indication: see J. A. Knecht,
A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and
the Problems (1972), 1 University of Illinois Law Forum 177 at 180 and n. 28. The
U.K. Abortion Act 1967 (1967, c. 7) contains a substantially similar indication. See also
note 46a infra.
23See note 9, supra.
24See Murray v. McMurchy, [1949] 1 W.W.R. 989; 2 D.L.R. 442 (B.C.S.C.).
25 M. Woodside, Sterilization in North Carolina, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1950) at 152-54; Brock Committee - Report of the
Departmental Committee on Sterilization, (1934); Cmd. 4485) at 32-33.
20 R.S.A. 1970, c. 341.
27 Postwar administrative policy in many American states has been to require the
consent of the patient, his next-of-kin or guardian. Paul, supra, note 19 at 78-80.
The writer has been advised that although the Alberta Sexual Sterilization Act does
not require it, the practice of the Eugenics Board of Alberta has been to obtain consent
wherever possible to the proposed sterilization of mentally defective persons. "Wherever
possible", so far as the Board is concerned, has meant the permission of the parents or,
in the absence of parents, the approval of the person in charge of the institutional care
of a mentally retarded person.
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variety of indications for the operation.28 Some of the American statutes indi-
cate punitive as well as eugenic objectives.29 Geneticists have criticized the
unscientific nature of the sterilization statutes,30 and the student of social
hitory may see in the legislation attempts by legislators to allay the fears
of constituents. These attempts were encouraged by a number of interested
individuals and organizations3l concerned that the population would be over-
whelmed by criminals, paupers and the mentally defective.32 The legislation
28 See "Eugenic Sterilization", in S. I. Brakel and R. S. Rock eds., The Mentally
Disabled and the Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) at 207; G. T.
Felkenes, "Sterilization and the Law", in New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, (Metu-
chen, NJ.: The Scarcecrow Press, 1968) 113 at 139; E. Z. Ferster, Eliminating the
Unfit - Is Sterilization the Answer? (1966), 27 Ohio State Law Journal 591; K. G.
McWhirter and J. Weijer, The Alberta Sterilization Act: A Genetic Critique (1969),
19 University of Toronto Law Journal 424; "Sex and the Other Sex", in the Report of
the National Institute on Mental Retardation, supra, note 2 at 87; "The Eugenics Board",
in W.R.N. Blair, Mental Health in Alberta, (Edmonton: Government of Alberta, 1969)
at 267.
Earlier analyses may be found in: Brock Committee, supra, note 25. Appendix
8--"Memorandum Regarding Foreign Laws on the Subject of Sterilization", at 109; J.H.
Landman, Human Sterilization, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932) at 54;
Committee of the American Neurological Association for the Investigation of Eugenical
Sterilization, Eugenical Sterilization: A Reorientation of the Problem (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1936) at 7.
29 See Felkenes, supra, note 28, at 139. See also discussion in State v. Feilen,
(1912), 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75, 40 LRA. (N.S.) 418, and n. in 40 L.R.A. (N.S.)
at 419.
30 E.g., McWhirter and Weijer, supra, note 28; J. R. Miller, H. G. Dunn and L. A.
Kerwood, Report to the Research, Clinical Services and Education Committee of the
A.R.C. of B.C., of the Sub-Committee on Sexual Sterilization in British Columbia
(1963), referred to in (1964), 14:3 Mental Retardation: (C.A.R.C.) at 25 (the British
Columbia statute is the Sexual Sterilization Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 353 as amended);
Committee of the American Neurological Association, supra, note 28, passim.
As for cases presented under the Alberta statute, the Blair Report noted that es-
sential evidence was often not available to the Eugenics Board. In other cases, it was
inadequate. Blair, supra, note 28 at 268.
31 "Mhe legislative victories of eugenics arose more from expert testimony before
legislative committees than from public demands. ... Eugenics remained primarily a
movement of specialists rather than a popular crusade. Hailer, supra, note 18, at 124.
For an account of the eugenics movement in the context of American social history, see
Haller, supra. Those who are familiar with The New Yorker Profile entitled "Professor
Sea Gull" may recall that Joe Gould, 'the last of the bohemians', "spent the summer
of 1915 as a student in eugenical field work at the Eugenics Record Office at Cold
Spring Harbour, Long Island. This organization, endowed by the Carnegie Institution,
was engaged at that time in making studies of families of hereditary defectives, paupers,
and town nuisances in several highly inbred communities. Such people were too prosaic
for Gould; he decided to specialize in Indians. That winter he went out to North
Dakota and measured the heads of a thousand Chippewas ... and of five hundred
Mandans ... " J. Mitchell, Joe Gould's Secret (New York: The Viking Press, 1965) at
26-27.
Not all eugenists favoured sterilization legislation. "TIhe enthusiasm of some
eugenists for sterilization was matched by the fear of others that neither existing know-
ledge, common decency, nor public opinion justified such laws." Haller, supra, at 124.
32 Committee of the American Neurological Association, supra, note 28 at 24-25.
See also Ont. Report of the Royal Commission on Public Welfare, (Toronto: King's
Printer, 1930) at 9, which recommended the enactment of sterilization legislation to
deal with immoral defectives and criminals.
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could be made use of to save administrators from the publicity which might
result from poor supervision. Less thought was given to the needs of the
retarded. People were sterilized who could never leave an institution,3 3 some
were required to consent to sterilization before they were allowed to leave,
3 4
others were sterilized and later were found not to be retarded.8 5 All this
indicates that the legislation and its application reflected a desire to protect
the general population, not primarily to help the retarded to adjust, so far as
possible, to the larger society.
Nuremberg told people all they wanted to know about eugenics,36 but
twenty-six"T state sterilization laws remain in force, as well as statutes in
Alberta and British Columbia.38 The post-war decline in statutory steriliza-
tions is attributed not to critical public opinion, but to "significant post-war
changes in administrative personnel and philosophy".39 The administrative
institution of strict consent procedures,40 together with professional concern
with the retarded person's ability to adjust to the larger community, repre-
sent attempts to help the retarded in spite of the eugenic and, in some cases,
punitive objectives of the sterilization statutes. Unfortunately, it would ap-
pear that these objectives enjoy some current support. The writer has been
advised that in the response to the Osgoode Hall Medical-Legal Question-
naire approximately 67% of the doctors who replied agreed that "forcible
sterilization of persons judged criminally insane, mentally retarded or feeble-
minded is ... a desirable social policy." Experience seems to have been a
poor teacher.41
Few today would claim that the sterilization statutes are genetically
sound, or that sterilization will rid society of 'poor heredity', but where these
statutes exist, there remains the possibility that some of those responsible
8
3 Brock Committee, supra, note 25 at 36. See also R. R. MacLean and E. J.
Kibblewhite, Sexual Sterilization in Alberta (1937), Canadian Public Health Journal
587 at 587.
84 R. C. Allen, Legal Norms and Practices Affecting the Mentally Deficient (1968),
38 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 635 at 638.
35 McWhirter and Weijer, supra, note 28 at 424. See also J. B. O'Hara and T. H.
Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization (1956), 45 Georgetown Law Journal 20 at 31.
30 Haller, supra, note 18 at 180; Paul, supra, note 19 at 78.
37 Brakel and Rock, supra, note 28 at 210.
38 Sexual Sterilization Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 353 as amended.
3 0 Paul, supra, note 19 at 78.
40 See supra, note 27.
41 "(C]ompulsory sterilization of the 'hereditary' retarded ... like the discovery
that the younger generation is going to the dogs, ... is a problem that every generation
has to work out for itself."
"I hope that this subject will be allowed to die a natural death, and that we will
hear no more of it until the next generation rediscovers this marvellous and original
solution to the problem of retardation." Letter from J. L. Evans to The Medical Journal
of Australia, reprinted in (1969), 3 Australian Children Limited 254 at 254, 256.
There have been suggestions recently in Canada and the United States that those
on welfare be sterilized. See J. Paul, The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals:
Current Attacks on Illegitimacy and the AFDC Program (1968), 3 Law and Society
Review 77; Ferster, supra, note 28 at 607-13, 623-24.
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for the day-to-day care of the retarded will use the statutes to eliminate the
possibility of propagation by their charges.4 It is suggested that their motiva-
tion is at least three-fold:
1. They see the results of these unions, children who may themselves be
retarded, and who in many cases cannot be raised by their parents.
2. They may resent the attitude of those retarded parents who see
nothing unnatural in parenthood without responsibility.
3. In the face of government indifference to improving facilities and
supervision both in institutions and in the community, some may find an
application under the statute a convenient way to avoid possible embarrass-
ment.
No doubt some would favour increased emphasis on a comprehensive
system which would emphasize care and supervision outside of institutions.
Such a system should include provision for an exhaustive review of each case
designed to ascertain whether sterilization is really necessary for the well-
being of the retarded person. This should be the primary consideration. The
understanding of the retarded person concerning the operation and its ad-
vantages to him would be tested. Reluctance on his part to undergo the
operation should be respected, even though it may involve additional super-
vision and expense. Consent in such circumstances should be defined in terms
of the retarded person's understanding13 rather than the wishes of those
responsible for his care.4
There are a number of lessons to be learned from the sterilization experi-
ment. In the first place, it should be obvious that sterilization, like abortion,
is no panacea for social and economic problems. Secondly, it is important
that programs be developed to acquaint the general public with the policy
decisions with which doctors are now confronted as a result of advances in
42 1n a study of six states which did not have sterilization legislation, institution
officials in four jurisdictions were opposed to involuntary sterilization laws. Ferster,
supra, note 28 at 606.
The Superintendent of a Home for the retarded in Manitoba advised the writer
that he was opposed to compulsory sterilization legislation. Although Manitoba has no
sterilization legislation, provision for the 'voluntary' (permission to be given by the
defective or his parent or guardian) sterilization of defectives was included in Bill No.
7 of 1933. After considerable discussion, the Manitoba Legislature deleted the two
sterilization sections from the Bill, which became The Mental Deficiency Act, S.M.
1933, c. 24. The proposed sterilization provisions met strong opposition from the
Roman Catholic community. A pamphlet setting out reasons for this opposition, which
was distributed in Winnipeg at the time, is reprinted in the February 27th edition of
the Winnipeg Free Press. Accounts of the controversy appeared in the Free Press and
the Tribune from February to May, 1933. One of the leaders of the opposition to the
sterilization provisions was Reverend Father Antoine D'Eschambault, who later wrote
a book entitled Eugenical Sterilization (Winnipeg: Canadian Publishers Limited, 1936).
43 The experience with the original Sexual Sterilization Act of Alberta (S.A. 1928,
c. 37), prior to the 1937 amendments (S.A. 1937 (1st Session), c. 47) is illuminating:
"In former times, when the consent of mental defectives was necessary, it seemed most
difficult to obtain that consent from the higher-grade defectives." MacLean and Kibble-
white, supra, note 33, at 588.
44 Consent by the latter "does not make the operation a voluntary one". Ferster,
supra, note 28 at 622.
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technology. For example, genetic screening is now being done in Canadian
and American communities where the population at risk is identifiable. 5
Tests can often identify apparently normal individuals who are carriers of
serious, sometimes fatal diseases. Where husband and wife are both carriers,
their children may be affected. If the couple elect to have children, amnio-
centesis will, in a number of cases, make possible prenatal diagnosis of
disease in the foetus. If the foetus is affected there is the possibility of
abortion. Indeed, one authority has stated that where diagnosis is made
before birth, "most physicians require both that the couple be willing or,
more precisely, desirous of terminating the pregnancy by aborting the abnor-
mal foetus and that the obstetrician be willing and able to do so. Otherwise,
the entire procedure becomes one which potentially may be psychologically
very traumatic to the pregnant woman".46 In a pamphlet entitled "Facts You
Should Know About Tay-Sachs Disease", published by the Tay-Sachs Testing
Programme of The Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto, it is stated that
"a pregnancy in which the foetus with Tay-Sachs disease is identified
[through amniocentesis] can be therapeutically terminated." The purpose of
the procedure is to ensure that only unaffected children are born. The eugenic
abortions performed in the course of furthering this purpose are not based
on probabilities but on proven defect. Yet they are permitted by law in
Canada and most American jurisdictions only under the fiction of danger to
the mental health of the mother.46a
Should proven defect be a justification for abortion? The prohibited
degrees of consanguinity have a eugenic basis, 47 and in Ontario a marriage
within the prohibited degrees is void. s Punishment for incest49 is similarly
based in part on the possibility that a child of such a union might be defective.
Our legislators have yet to deal with situations involving the certain know-
ledge of defect before birth. Their reluctance is understandable, since we
have not yet adequately examined the policy bases of our present laws.
45 See Time Magazine, September 13, 1971 at 58; pamphlet on testing for Tay-
Sachs disease, infra.
46 C. J. Epstein, Medical Genetics: Recent Advances with Legal Implications (1969),
21 Hastings Law Journal 35 at 43.
46a This was written before the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Roe
v. Wade (1973), 93 S.Ct. 705 and Doe v. Bolton (1973). 93 S.Ct. 739. The result of Roe v.
Wade is that American states may now proscribe abortion only for the stage subsequent
to viability. Excepted from possible state proscription, however, are abortions which are
necessary, in appropriate medical judgement, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother. It would therefore appear that the fiction referred to above has been extended
by the Court, for the stage subsequent to viability, to states which have not yet enacted
legislation making substantial risk of grave physical or mental defect in the child a justi-
fication for abortion. As to the earlier stages, the Court's insistence that "the abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision", and that "basic
responsibility for it must rest with the physician" is inconsistent with physicians' assertions
that most abortions approved on psychiatric grounds are based on non-medical consider-
ations. If the result of the Court's decisions is to increase the pressure on physicians to
perform abortions based on non-medical considerations, presumably physicians must
resort to the formula of fiction if they are to avoid "the usual remedies, judicial and intra-
professional", which the Court indicates are available against the practitioner who "abuses
the privilege of exercising proper medical judgement". Roe v. Wade (1973), 93 S.Ct. 705,
per Blackmun, J. at 733.
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A distinguished biologist has suggested that, having identified the car-
riers of defective genes, we try to discourage them from marrying each other.
He would leave the decision to the engaged couples themselvesY0 Such
questions bring us back to the need for considering the entire field of Control
of Life. Consideration need not await the further achievements of techno-
logy, and should not await the enthusiasms awakened by other social and
economic problems. Finally, we must make sure that whatever legislation
results will deal with the retarded and others in need of special protection in
a manner which recognizes their rightful place in the community.
47Bromley, Family Law (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1971) at 26.
4 8 The application of the prohibited degrees in Ontario is dealt with in H. R. Hahlo,
"Nullity of Marriage", in D. Mendes da Costa, ed., 2 Studies in Canadian Family Law
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) 651 at 660.
49 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 150.
50P. B. Medawar, "Genetic Options: An Examination of Current Fallacies", in
D. H. Labby ed., Life or Death: Ethics and Options, (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1968) 94 at 109-10.

